Over the past two years, commission-free trades have become the norm for retail investors using an online broker. What makes this practice possible – and profitable – is a market structure that permits payment for order flow (PFOF). In our opinion, the true price of these “free” trades is the loss of best execution, market transparency and a market that favors wholesaler entities that provide routing and have an affiliated market maker (MM).
Although the PFOF discussion centers on equity markets, an overlooked part of this discussion is that the equity options market functions in the same way. It is generally accepted that options are traded entirely on-exchange in comparison to approximately 52% of US equities
This deviates from the “on-exchange and open for competition” narrative our industry promotes. It also inaccurately implies that maximum price improvement has taken place for an order, which in certain aspects the current market structure actually discourages.
While it receives little attention, the majority (61%) of PFOF payments in 2020 – totaling $1.5 billion
This structure discourages competition and harms retail investors as they pay wider spreads than they would in a fully competitive environment. When wholesalers with an affiliated MM work with retail brokers, they also have a number of matching models to pick from that limit – or entirely remove – the ability of other market participants to compete for that flow.
Just four wholesalers, all of which have an affiliated MM arm, dominate the market and collectively route an estimated 80%
This concentration and lack of competitive pricing results from an antiquated market structure for promoting liquidity, competition and transparency. With an effort led by the SEC the market structure can be updated and improved in three key ways.
Specialist Appointments
The US equity options market structure has evolved to tilt the playing field in favor of those who have achieved huge scale, not necessarily to those who provide the best prices. While economies of scale are a part of any industry, we have reached the point that healthy competition from new or existing MMs that focus on a handful of option symbols is nearly almost entirely excluded. This is particularly evident by how exchanges reward breadth of coverage over all else for appointments of specialist.
- Specialist appointments that are made in perpetuity and guarantee significant order allocation for wholesalers/MMs who bring flow to an exchange – not necessarily those who provide the best pricing for the market.
- Tiering of MM fees, incentives, and specialist appointment processes should be more focused on rewarding those who make the best markets rather than those who have a routing wholesale arm and are simply present everywhere.
- The Regulation National Market System should be re-evaluated to ensure it incentivizes the correct balance between competition and complexity.
